Why Zenstra

Your agents act on their own.Someone has to decide first.

AI agents now read your documents, hold your credentials and act in your core systems. Zenstra decides every action before it runs, and keeps the record that proves it.

Inside the Zenstra core

Secure every agent.
Verify every intent.

Agents work inside workflows, in your cloud and on every laptop. Take the core apart to see where each attack is stopped, and what lands on the record.

The exposure

Agents act faster than your controls.

They read documents, call tools and move data inside workflows, in your cloud and on every laptop. The same few attacks reach all three.

Prompt injectionTool poisoningCredential leakageShadow AI
One policy engine

One engine decides every action.

Each action is checked against the agent’s identity, the task it was given and your policy, inline, before it runs.

deny  tool.call   when outside(task.scope)hold  payments.*  for human approvalallow crm.read    for member in task

Inline · p95 18 ms · Fails closed

Workflow Security

Every hop, checked against its task.

Runs in
n8n, Zapier, LangGraph, CrewAI, Copilot Studio
Checks
Every hop and agent-to-agent hand-off
Stops
Injected instructions spreading between agents

Blockhop 7 · crm.export → outside email · not in task

Cloud Security

A gateway inside your cloud.

Runs in
Your VPC on AWS, Azure or Google Cloud
Checks
Every MCP, model and API call against the agent’s grant
Stops
Tool poisoning, over-scoped keys, data leaving your cloud

Blockmcp core-banking · accounts.transfer · not in grant

Prompts and payloads never leave your VPC

Zenstra AI Discovery

AI on every laptop, contained in seconds.

Runs on
Windows and macOS, through Intune, Jamf or Kandji
Checks
Copilot, ChatGPT, Claude Code and Cursor: prompt, tool call and device together
Stops
Hijacked coding agents, secrets pasted into AI, shadow AI

Blocklaptop-114 · cursor · read ~/.aws · session contained

The record

Every decision, on one record.

Each entry is chained to the one before it, so any change shows. Export it as evidence for your auditors and examiners.

#48213  block  POL-114 v7   prev 9f2c…a71e#48214  hold   POL-021 v3   prev c07a…5d12#48215  allow  POL-003 v12  prev 4be1…09c3

Hash-chained · Exported as PDF and CSV

See the decision record
The challenge

Every AI agent is a new identity with real access.

Agents run in workflows, in your cloud and on laptops, connected to your systems by credentials most identity and data tools never see.

Created by anyone

No-code flows, copilots and coding agents are built by business teams and developers, not provisioned by IT.

Holding real credentials

Tokens, API keys, OAuth apps, service accounts and MCP connections, many with standing, broad access.

Acting without a person

They decide and act in seconds, inside the systems that move money and member data.

Already happening

Agents act on real access, and attackers have noticed.

Five public incidents from 2025, each with its source, and the Zenstra control that applies to that kind of action.

  1. Microsoft 365 Copilot · EchoLeak

    Hidden instructions in an email could lead Copilot to disclose internal data with no action from the user. Microsoft fixed it (CVE-2025-32711) and reported no exploitation.

  2. A coding agent deletes a production database

    During a code freeze, Replit’s agent ran destructive commands against the production database of a SaaStr founder’s project, despite instructions not to change anything.

  3. Amazon Q extension ships an injected prompt

    Version 1.84.0 of the VS Code extension contained a prompt telling the agent to wipe systems and cloud resources. A syntax error stopped it from running.

  4. Salesloft Drift OAuth tokens

    Tokens held by an AI chat integration were used to export Salesforce data from customer instances between 8 and 18 August, and to search it for further credentials.

  5. The first malicious MCP server

    An npm package posing as a Postmark MCP server added one line in version 1.0.16 that copied every email an agent sent to the attacker.

Controlled access

Agent security starts with an owner and a scope.

Zenstra ties every agent to the person it acts for, maps every credential it holds, and narrows each grant to the task in front of it.

  • Every agent has a named owner who answers for it.
  • Every credential is mapped to the systems it reaches.
  • Every grant is scoped to the task and expires on its own.
Agent identity and access
Challenge and solution

What changes with Zenstra.

Without Zenstra

  • Agents found after an incident, one platform at a time
  • Standing keys and service accounts with broad scope
  • Logs that show what happened, after it happened
  • A separate switch in every vendor to stop one agent
  • Evidence pulled together by hand for every exam

With Zenstra

  • One inventory of every agent, each with a named owner
  • Grants scoped to the task that expire on their own
  • Every action decided inline, before it runs
  • One revocation stops an agent everywhere, in seconds
  • A tamper-evident record, exported as evidence
What sets Zenstra apart

Built to decide, not only to watch.

Most tools see an agent after it acts. Zenstra is in the path of every action, with the context to tell a helpful agent from a hijacked one.

  • Inline, not after the fact

    Zenstra sits in the path of the action. Allow, hold or block is decided before the tool runs, not flagged in a log afterwards.

  • Intent, not only identity

    Each action is checked against the task the agent was given, so a hijacked agent holding valid credentials is still stopped.

  • Inside your environment

    The gateway runs in your VPC. Prompts and payloads never leave your cloud, and nothing in your agents is rewritten.

  • Evidence an examiner accepts

    Every decision is chained to the one before it, with the policy version that made it, and exports as a report.